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Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla Revisited:




Last year the author published a paper, "Iraq and the 800-Pound
Gorilla," which argued that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and removal of the
Ba'ath Party from power was permissible under international law.' That
argument was based on several premises: (1) that Iraq under Saddam
Hussein was an aggressive state, as its past conduct had demonstrated; 2 (2)
that Iraq had developed chemical and biological weapons and had an active
program for developing nuclear weapons; 3 (3) that Iraq, in 2003, continued
to possess chemical and biological weapons and continued to have an
active nuclear weapons program;4 and (4) that the human rights situation in
Iraq made the country a good candidate for a humanitarian intervention.
5
However, U.S. search teams have not, as of this writing (September 2004),
found evidence of actual weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq or
evidence of active WMD programs and systems. The third premise, that
Iraq was in possession of WMDs at the time of the invasion, therefore
seems likely to be disproved. Since that premise was the United States'
primary argument in favor of invasion, further discussion of its legality is
Visiting Scholar, George Washington University; J.D., New York University, 1994;
LL.M., George Washington University, 2003.
1. Davis Brown, Enforcing Arms Control Agreements by Military Force: Iraq and the
800-Pound Gorilla, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159 (2003).
2. See id. at 172, 182, 202-05, 221-22.
3. Id. at 176-78, 187, 201-03. See generally KHIDHIR HAMZA, SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER
(2000).
4. See Brown, supra note 1, at 215-18.
5. Id. at 223-24. The topic of the article was the use of force to enforce obligations in
the area of arms control, not in the area of human rights. Humanitarian intervention was
only tangential and for that reason the original article did not expound on this theory.
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necessary.
Although it is possible that evidence of existing WMDs will
ultimately be found,6 thus exonerating the Bush administration's claim, this
article will reassess the legality of the invasion under the premise that Iraq
did not possess any actual WMDs at the time of the invasion. The current
article will show that the invasion of Iraq and the ouster of the Ba'ath
regime were nevertheless permissible in international law, under the
doctrines of anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian intervention.
I. Anticipatory Self-Defense - "Be Careful What You Wish
For..."
A. Some Troubling Questions
There are three possible reasons for the lack of evidence of existing
WMDs at the time of the invasion. First, the weapons systems and
documentation did and still do exist, but simply have not been found.
Indeed, they could be buried so deeply, in a place known to so few
individuals, that they may never be found. Alternatively, they could have
been spirited out of Iraq and into neighboring countries, such as Syria.
Second, the weapons systems and documentation existed at the time of
the invasion, but were destroyed when the invasion began, or when a U.S.-
led invasion was imminent. The finding of alleged mobile biological
weapons laboratories scrubbed with a chlorine solution tends to support
this theory. If either the first or second possibilities are true, then the Bush
administration's factual claims were correct.
The third possibility is that at some point after the First Gulf War, Iraq
really did destroy its WMD systems. This article will assume arguendo
that this is what happened. There is no doubt that Iraq did possess
chemical weapons as late as 1988, because they were used. The evidence
that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program as late as 1994,8 and an
6. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency asserted that it must still review millions of
pages of documents, visit hundreds of sites, and interview thousands of witnesses. Dana
Priest, No Evidence That Pressure Influenced Iraq Analysis, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at
A17. In addition, a significant amount of the chemicals that UNSCOM/UNMOVIC
believes Iraq manufactured still remains unaccounted for. See Brown, supra note 1, at 215.
7. Iraq used mustard gas and tabun on Iranian forces from 1983 to 1988, and mustard
gas on Kurdish civilians in 1988. See U.N. Doc. S/16433 (1984); U.N. Doc. S/17127
(1985); U.N. Doc. S/17911 (1986); U.N. Doc. S/18852 (1987); U.N. Doc. S/19823 (1988).
See also Brown, supra note 1, at 203.
8. HAMZA, supra note 3. Mr. Hamza escaped from Iraq in 1994.
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active biological weapons program as late as 19959 are virtually irrefutable.
That being the case, Iraqi authorities would have to have destroyed the
weapons while the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections were in
progress, or during the four-year period from 1998 to 2002 when no
inspections were taking place.
A conclusion that Iraq destroyed its WMDs after the end of the First
Gulf War raises some troubling questions. First, why was documentation
of the WMD programs not also destroyed, but instead dispersed and hidden
from inspectors? There can be only two logical explanations. One is that
Iraq intended to reconstitute its WMD programs once the U.N.-imposed
sanctions were lifted and international attention was focused elsewhere.
The second possible explanation is that Iraq intended to deceive others into
believing it still had WMDs, even though it did not.
The second, more important question is: if Iraq really did dismantle its
WMD programs, why did it not do so openly under U.N. supervision,' ° but
instead go to extraordinary lengths to thwart the inspection process? One
possible reason is that Saddam Hussein wanted the sanctions to remain in
place, for his family had a substantial financial interest in Iraqi smuggling
operations. However, this possibility is not very plausible; the family
already controlled much of the import and export business in Iraq and the
Tikriti clan would have benefited more from legal trade than illegal trade.
The increase in legitimate import and export would have meant greater
profits, as well as the substantially greater tax revenue generated by the
improvement in the economy, part of which may be reasonably assumed to
have been lining Saddam's coffers. These increases in revenue would have
more than offset the decreases of revenue from a drop in the smuggling
business.
The second possible explanation is more likely: believing that the
United Nations would be eager to disengage from Iraq, Iraq's strategy was
to minimally satisfy the inspectors yet still create some doubt, and retain
the ability to rebuild its programs. The destruction of the WMDs, thought
the Iraqis, might satisfy the inspectors enough to end to the inspection
process and get the economic sanctions lifted. However, the unsupervised
destruction of WMDs and concealment of systems and components was
intended to plant the seeds of doubt in the minds of the inspectors and the
9. See Brown, supra note 1, at 188, 201.
10. When South Africa renounced its nuclear ambitions, it dismantled its program
under U.N. supervision in order to instill international confidence in South Africa's good
faith. The heads of UNMOVIC and the IAEA both called attention to this fact to contrast
the behavior of Iraq, whose actions instilled no confidence at all. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692, at
11(2003).
2004)
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international community. Iraq could continue to pose a potential threat to
its neighbors and in doing so would be able to either intimidate its
neighbors or to reemerge as the regional power that it aspired to be."
Meanwhile, dispersing documentation and components would decrease the
chances of the inspectors finding them, and Iraq's WMD programs would
be able to emerge from the inspection process with its knowledge base and
core competencies intact. Iraq would be able to reconstitute its WMD
programs, transforming itself from a perceived threat to an actual one.
Saddam Hussein could have his cake and eat it too.
The third question raised by the conclusion that Iraq destroyed its
WMD systems prior to the invasion is whether the United States and Great
Britain genuinely believed that Iraq continued to possess WMDs and the
capability to produce them. Former chief U.S. weapons inspector David
Kay's interviews and testimony before Congress," as well as the report of
the British judge Lord Hutton, 13 indicate that the U.S. and Great Britain
acted in good faith. They genuinely believed, based on their intelligence
gathering and on Iraq's suspicious conduct,' 4 that Iraq did possess such
weapons and capabilities at the time of the invasion. When Mr. Kay said
"We were almost all wrong,"' 5 what he was conveying was that
intelligence agencies around the world (including French and German)
were duped into seeing what Iraq wanted them to see.
B. Analysis of Anticipatory Self-Defense Remains the Same
It is thus necessary to reevaluate the legality of the invasion of Iraq
and ouster of Saddam Hussein under two different premises than those
under which the original article was based. These new premises are: (1)
11. See TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 103 (1996).
12. In an interview with the Washington Post, Kay blames the mistaken belief that Iraq
still possessed WMDs at the time of the invasion on the CIA, not on the Bush
administration. Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, Kay Cites Evidence ofIraq Disarming;
Action Taken in '90s, Ex-Inspector Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2004, at Al. In testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004, Kay denied that any
pressure or "command influence" was exerted on his team to make conclusions favorable
the Bush administration's position. Before the invasion, Kay himself believed that WMDs
existed in Iraq, and in his statement he noted that French and German intelligence agencies
did as well. Transcript, David Kay at Senate Hearing, available at
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/>.
13. LORD HUTTON, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE DEATH OF DR DAVID KELLY C.M.G., House of Commons No. HC 247 (2004), available
at <http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/ rulings.htm>.
14. See Brown, supra note 1, at 187-90, 199-202, 213-18.
15. Transcript, David Kay at Senate, supra note 12.
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Iraq actually had no WMDs at the time of the invasion; and (2) Iraq
intentionally deceived the U.S. and other States into believing that it had
WMDs and active WMD programs. Under the tort-based approach to
anticipatory self-defense presented in the original article, when a State
breaches an obligation, and that breach results in an injury to another State,
the injured State has the right to a remedy from the breaching State. The
elements to this approach are Duty, Breach, Injury, and Remedy.
1. Duty. Iraq had two specific obligations in international law with
regard to WMDs. First was not to develop or possess them, or attempt to
do so. Iraq's duty not to develop nuclear weapons stems from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty 16 and Security Council Resolution 687."7 Its duty not
to develop biological weapons stems from the Biological Weapons
Convention.' 8 Under Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq had a duty to
destroy its existing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. 9
Second, Iraq also had affirmative duties to declare its WMDs and submit to
United Nations inspections and U.N.-supervised dismantling of those
programs.2 ° Prior to the invasion, the Security Council reaffirmed these
latter duties in Security Council Resolution 1441.21
2. Breach. Assuming arguendo that Iraq ultimately complied with its
duty not to possess WMDs by destroying them, it is still uncontroverted
that Iraq did not comply with its duties of declaration and cooperation with
the inspection process. Security Council Resolution 1441 declared Iraq in
material breach of those duties,2 2 and stated that further non-cooperation
would put Iraq in "further material breach of [its] obligations." 23 Except
for some isolated incidents, U.N. inspectors found Iraq to be generally
cooperative in the inspection process.24 However, Iraq continued to be
16. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. II, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
17. S.C. Res. 687, 12 (1991). The resolution was enacted under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, which gives the Security Council the authority to decide on measures to be
taken to maintain and restore international peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. As a
member of the United Nations, Iraq was duty-bound to "accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
18. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10, 1972,
art. 1, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. Iraq ratified the Convention on April 18, 1991.
19. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 17, 8(a).
20. Id. 9(a), 9(b), 12.
21. S.C. Res. 1441, 3, 5, and 7 (2002).
22. Jd. 1.
23. Id. 4.
24. See Brown, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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uncooperative in substance.
3. Injury. The immediate consequence of Iraq's non-cooperation was
the lack of confidence on the part of U.N. agencies and other States that
Iraq had truly disarmed its WMDs and dismantled its WMD development
programs. Iraq acted like a State with something to hide, and it was
naturally assumed that Iraq sought to hide its WMDs and documentation
from the inspections. A further consequence was that Iraq, known to have
possessed and used WMDs in the past, had to be regarded as continuing to
possess them and continuing to have a propensity to use them. The Ba'ath
regime's defiant and unapologetic posture after the Gulf War25 eviscerated
any confidence that Iraq would not return to its aggressive ways.
4. Remedy. Because the injury was the threat of force, a remedy
involving the use of force was appropriate. However, a limited use of force
(Operation Desert Fox) had already been tried and had failed. As the
author wrote in the original article:
The appropriate remedy was not the continuation of inspections ... for
it had become painfully apparent that not even the threat of force would
be sufficient to convince Iraq to disarm; indeed, the threat of force only
would have driven the program further underground.... Iraq's conduct
during the last twelve years ... demonstrated that as long as the Ba'ath
party remained in power, Iraq would continue to manufacture chemical
and biolo ical weapons and continue its program to develop nuclear
weapons.
The use of force for the sole purpose of destroying Iraq's WMD
programs was no longer viable; the programs' documentation and
components were scattered and the weapons (which Iraq caused the U.S.
and Great Britain to believe it still possessed) could not be precisely
located. The regime, and Saddam Hussein in particular, had proven itself
to be so impervious to non-forcible forms of pressure that it was
unreasonable to believe that he would not return to his old ways if given
the opportunity. Only the removal of the Ba'ath regime from power in Iraq
would provide an adequate remedy at this point; this objective could only
be accomplished by a forcible invasion of Iraq.
Which State, then, stands in breach of international law? An analogy
may be drawn to the principle of perfidy in the law of armed conflict.
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines perfidy as
an act "inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
25. See U.N. Doc. S/22456 & Annex (1991), containing Iraq's response to Security
Council Resolution 687.
26. Brown, supra note 1, at 222-23.
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he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that
confidence., 27 For example, if State A deliberately places a high-value
target, such as a weapons storage facility or a command center, under a
protected site such as a hospital or elementary school, and State B destroys
the protected site in an effort to destroy the military target, the violator of
the law of armed conflict is State A. It is useful to recall the incident
during the First Gulf War in which Iraq generated much press attention by
showing pictures of a historic mosque missing its dome, claiming that
Coalition forces had attacked a protected site. In actuality, Iraqi authorities
had removed the dome themselves in an attempt to sway public opinion.28
A State that once engages in such perfidious propaganda demonstrates a
propensity to do so again, and that is indeed what Iraq did.
The United States and Great Britain acted in good faith,
notwithstanding the fact that the WMDs have not been found and may have
been destroyed years before the invasion. Iraq, in contrast, acted in bad
faith, by embarking on a program to deliberately deceive other States into
believing it still possessed WMDs. Its subterfuge having succeeded, Iraq
can hardly be portrayed as the victim when it suffers the consequences of
other States acting upon the false conclusions that Iraq intended for them to
draw. Consequently it would be unfair to label the U.S. and its coalition
partners as the aggressors for acting upon the threat which they perceived
in good faith, but which Iraq engineered in bad faith.
II. Darkness in the Land of Mordor - Humanitarian
Intervention to Oust Saddam Hussein
A. Reemergence of Humanitarian Intervention in Customary
International Law
Humanitarian intervention is the use of force, without Security
Council authorization, to stop a government from committing widespread
violations of fundamental human rights on a large scale. Proponents of the
doctrine, of which this author is one, argue that the right of humanitarian
27. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 37, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3.
28. Iraq also has a record of co-locating legitimate military targets with protected sites;
in the First Gulf War Iraq parked fighter aircraft next to an ancient Sumerian temple. See
Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed
Conflict, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 277, 301 (1997).
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intervention in customary international law, once dormant and superseded
by article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 29 has reemerged.30  Commonly cited
examples of state practice include the liberation of East Pakistan from West
Pakistan by India in 1971 ;31 the ouster of Idi Amin in Uganda by Tanzania
in 1979;32 the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 to oust the Pol Pot
regime;33 the creation and enforcement of no-fly zones in northern and
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) reads, "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
30. Scholars are divided on the validity of humanitarian intervention in international
law today. Recent works supporting the right of humanitarian intervention include
ANTHONY D. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 351 (1995);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 174 (2002) (finding that some uses of force are
"illegal but justifiable"); FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 107
(2d ed. 1992); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000). Recent works denying the right of humanitarian
intervention include Ian Brownfie, International Law and the Use of Force by States
Revisited, 21 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 34-35 (2001); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR
JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-13 (2001);
YORAM DrNSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 67 (3d ed., 2001); LOUIS HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 120 (1995); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 118-19 (1991). In SEAN D. MURPHY,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 102-
03 (1996), which was written prior to Kosovo, Professor Murphy remained neutral as to the
legality and desirability of the doctrine, but was optimistic about the role of the Security
Council, whose engagement would render the question moot.
31. For factual accounts of the events leading to the intervention in and secession of
East Pakistan, see KALYAN CHAUDHURI, GENOCIDE IN BANGLADESH (1972); INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN, 1971 (1972) (EVENTS IN EAST
PAKISTAN); ROBERT PAYNE, MASSACRE (1973); RICHARD SISSON & LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND
SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH (1990). For legal
analyses of the intervention, see FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 113-120 (1999); EVENTS IN EAST
PAKISTAN, supra.
32. For factual accounts and legal analyses of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda,
see ABIEW, supra note 31, at 120-27; Amnesty International, Human Rights in Uganda,
1978 (Al Index: AFR 59/05/78) (Human Rights in Uganda); TONY AVIRGAN & MARTHA
HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN (1982); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURISTS, UGANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1977); THOMAS MELADY & MARGARET MELADY, IDI
AMIN DADA: HITLER IN AFRICA (1977); GEORGE IVAN SMITH, GHOSTS OF KAMPALA (1980);
TESON, supra note 30, at 179-95; WHEELER, supra note 30, at 111-36; Farooq Hassan,
Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian
Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859 (1981).
33. For detailed facts on the Vietnamese ouster of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, see
JOHN BARRON & ANTHONY PAUL, MURDER OF A GENTLE LAND: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
COMMUNIST GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA (1977); CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH
DEATH (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989); DAVID P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN
(Vol. 28:1
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southern Iraq from 1991-2003 ;34 and NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia
to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians in 1999. 35 The ouster
of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq is the latest in a growing body of
state practice supporting the right of humanitarian intervention.
The U.N. Charter, and article 2(4) in particular, must be interpreted in
light of customary international law. The doctrine of humanitarian
intervention has roots as far back as the work of Hugo Grotius, who wrote
in 1646, "[K]ings.. . have the right of demanding punishment not only on
account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also
on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively
violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons
whatsoever., 36 Grotius held the opinion that the people could not lawfully
rise up against their ruler themselves, and so further wrote, "If... it should
be granted that even in extreme need subjects cannot justifiably take up
HISTORY 236-72 (1991); JOAN D. CRIDDLE & TEEDA BuTr NAM, To DESTROY You Is No
Loss: THE ODYSSEY OF A CAMBODIAN FAMILY (1987); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1 st Session, May 3, 1977;
BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER
THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-1979 (1996); MARIE ALEXANDRINE MARTIN, CAMBODIA: A
SHATTERED SOCIETY 157-214 (Mark W. McLeod trans., 1994). For detailed analyses of
Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia under international law, see GARY KLINTWORTH,
VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989); WHEELER, supra
note 30, at 78-110.
34. For factual detail and legal analyses of the establishment and enforcement of the
Iraq No-Fly Zones, see ABIEW, supra note 31, at 145-58; MURPHY, supra note 30, at 165-
80; TESON, supra note 30, at 234-41; WHEELER, supra note 30, at 138-52; Catherine S.
Knowles, Life and Human Dignity, the Birthright ofAll Human Beings: An Analysis of the
Iraqi Genocide of the Kurds and Effective Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 NAVAL L. REV.
152 (1998). A collection of pertinent U.N. documents has been compiled by Marc Weller.
IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 625-715 (M. Weller ed., 1993).
The human rights situation in Iraq has been documented in the annual reports of Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department.
35. For detailed facts and discussions of the legality of the NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia in 1999, see CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 206-13; FRANCK, supra note 30, at
163-70; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A WEEK OF TERROR IN DRENICA: HUMANITARIAN LAW
VIOLATIONS IN Kosovo (1999); INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KoSovo,
THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000);
KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Albrecht Schnabel &
Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000); MATTHEW MCALLESTER, BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS OF THE
DAMNED: THE WAR INSIDE KoSovo (2002); THE Kosovo TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
DIMENSIONS (Ken Booth ed., 2001); WAR OVER Kosovo: POLITICS AND STRATEGY IN A
GLOBAL AGE (Andrew J. Bacevich & Eliot A. Cohen eds., 2001); WHEELER, supra note 30,
at 257-75.
36. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACiS LIBRI TRES bk. ii, chap. xx, sec. xl, 1
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Classics of
International Law, 1925) (1646).
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arms... nevertheless it will not follow that others may not take up arms on
their behalf."
37
In the nineteenth century the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
theorized by Grotius and others38 began to be realized in state practice,
through a series of interventions to protect minorities from oppression.
From 1827 to 1830, Great Britain, France and Russia liberated Greece from
the Ottoman Empire in response to several massacres of Greeks at the
hands of the Turks. 9 In 1836 Henry Wheaton cited the liberation of
Greece as an "illustration of the principles of international law authorizing
such an interference,. . .where the general interests of humanity are
infringed by the excesses of a barbarous and despotic government., 40 In
1860-61, France sent forces to quell massacres of Christians in Syria, in
which the Ottomans were also complicit. 41 Although Turkey consented to
the French deployment, its consent was, as Michael Reisman put it, "a
matter of constraint rather than volition. 42 In 1898, public outcry in the
United States over brutal Spanish suppression of an insurrection in Cuba
was one reason the U.S. decided to go to war with Spain and liberate
Cuba.43 By the early twentieth century the term "humanitarian
intervention" had entered the lexicon of international law.44
The renunciation of war after the First World War in the form of the
37. Id. bk. ii, chap. xxv, sec. viii, 3.
38. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. viii,
chap. vi, § 14 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, The Classics of International Law, 1934) (1688); 3 EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, LES DROTS DES GEN, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA
CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS bk. ii, chap. iv, § 56 (Charles G.
Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington, The Classics of International Law,
1925) (1758).
39. For more detailed factual accounts, see CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 28-32;
MURPHY, supra note 30, at 52-53; HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
91-94 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1836).
40. WHEATON, supra note 39, at 91. Chesterman finds this passage the first in modem
terms to articulate a doctrine of intervention on the basis of humanity. CHESTERMAN, supra
note 30, at 24.
41. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 32-33; MURPHY, supra note 30, at 53-54;
ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-66 (1921).
42. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the lbos, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 180 (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
1973). See also STOWELL, supra note 41, at 66.
43. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 33-35; MURPHY, supra note 30, at 55-56;
STOWELL, supra note 41, at 120-22.
44. Stowell attributed the first use of the term to the 1895 edition of W.E. Hall's
treatise. STOWELL, supra note 41, at 5 1, citing WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 304, note 1 (4th ed. 1895).
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Pact of Paris, 45 as well as the Axis powers' abuse of the doctrine during the
inter-war period,4 6 soured the world's taste for humanitarian intervention,
and the doctrine fell into desuetude. Hence the U.N. Charter makes no
provision for a right of humanitarian intervention. 7 In the 1970s, however,
beginning with the Indian liberation of East Pakistan, the doctrine
cautiously reemerged. The experience of Uganda was a watershed event;
unlike East Pakistan and Cambodia, the Uganda case was not mired in Cold
War politics and States could not bring themselves to condemn the
invasion, as they had done in the past.48 In the case of Kosovo, NATO
members justified the air strikes primarily on the basis of the plight of the
Kosovar Albanians, albeit dancing around the words "humanitarian
intervention. 'A9  Although Security Council decisions are only rarely
45. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 94 L.N.T.S. 57,
63. In addition, the Covenant of the League of Nations prohibited war in settlement of
disputes unless certain dispute-resolution procedures were followed. LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COVENANT arts. 12-16.
46. Specific incidents include the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and the German annexation of the Sudetenland in 1939. See
Statement by the Japanese Government, December 27, 1931, in 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: JAPAN 1931-1941 72, 72 (1943) (justifying
military occupation to prevent "anarchy"); Text of the Note Which the Italian Government
Addressed on November 11, 1935, to All Governments Which, At Geneva, Voted for
Sanctions Against Italy, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC
PAPERS 1935 684, 685 (1953) (claiming to free 16,000 slaves); Preamble to the Decree of
March 16 [1939] of the Reich Government on the Establishment of the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC
PAPERS 1939 51, 52 (1956) (justifying the annexation "to safeguard the national
individuality of the German and Czech peoples, and to further the peace and social welfare
of all").
47. Official reports of Committees at the San Francisco conference do not reveal any
on-the-record discussion of the humanitarian intervention as an exception to Article 2(4). 3
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. (1945). But see FRANCK, supra note 30, at 14 (reproducing an Australian
diplomatic note to the U.S. inquiring about the legality of interference in the internal affairs
of a State that is persecuting its Jewish population); id. at 18 (recounting how Great Britain
and the Soviet Union opposed drafts of the Charter that "would have made illegal a state's
violence against persons and subjected it to the same sanctions as violence perpetrated
against another state").
48. For a more comprehensive exposition of States' reactions to humanitarian
interventions of the 1970s, see CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 74, 78, 80-81; WHEELER,
supra note 30, at 58-59, 89-100, 122-31; FRANCK, supra note 30, at 141-42, 144-45, 146-50,
152. After India's liberation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan, India's Soviet-bloc
supporters approved of the intervention but the Western powers did not. See WHEELER,
supra note 30, at 68-72. Cold War politics yielded similar results after Vietnam's invasion
of Cambodia. See id. at 89-90. In contrast, the case of Uganda had little or no significance
in the Cold War.
49. NATO Press Release 1999-040 (Mar. 23, 1999) (NATO Secretary-General); U.N.
Doc. S/PV.3988, at 4 (1999) (United States); id at 17 (Germany); id. at 8 (Netherlands); id
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influential in the course of international law, it is nevertheless significant
that a draft Security Council resolution condemning the air strikes failed by
a vote of 3 in favor to 12 against.50 State practice points to the conclusion
that the right of humanitarian intervention in customary international law is
no longer dormant.
B. The Tort-Based Approach to Humanitarian Intervention
The elements of the tort-based approach, Duty, Breach, Injury, and
Remedy, which the author presented in the original article to analyze
anticipatory self-defense, are equally applicable to humanitarian
intervention. States have a duty, in both treaty-based law 5' and by an
emerging norm of jus cogens,52 to respect and uphold the fundamental
human rights of their populations. Among these include the right to life,53
freedom from torture,54 and freedom from arbitrary detention. 55 The right
to life and freedom from torture are non-derogable rights;5 6 the freedom
from arbitrary detention is derogable only "[i]n time of public emergency
at 12 (Great Britain). Belgium has gone as far as to assert the right of humanitarian
intervention in international law. Legality of Use of Force (Provisional Measures),
pleadings of Belgium before the ICJ., May 10, 1999, reprinted in CHESTERMAN, supra note
30, at 46.
50. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988, supra note 49. Russia, China and Namibia voted in favor of
the resolution. Voting against it were the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, the
Netherlands, Slovenia, Argentina, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Bahrain and Malaysia.
51. Relevant human rights treaties include the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified in 24
I.L.M. 525 (1985); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180 (1979),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III) (1948) (UDHR), a non-binding hortatory declaration of the basic civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights of individuals, is widely regarded as a normative
instrument, creating or reflecting the legal obligations of states in this area.
52. Louis Henkin regards the prohibitions of genocide and apartheid as peremptory
norms of international law. HENKIN, supra note 30, at 181. Thomas Buergenthal and Sean
Murphy assert that the prohibitions of slavery and torture have entered that realm as well.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
120 (3d ed. 2002), citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
153 (1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, 349 (1999).
53. UDHR, supra note 51, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 6.
54. UDHR, supra note 51, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 7.
55. UDHR, supra note 51, art. 9; ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9.
56. ICCPR, supra note 5 1, art. 4(2).
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which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed., 57 As described in greater detail below, the Ba'ath
regime under Saddam Hussein violated the fundamental human rights of
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, while remaining completely unaccountable
for its actions.58
The injury to the population taken as a whole is the breach of the
social contract between the governing and the governed, resulting in a
significant loss of security and societal growth. This loss of security is
manifested in tangible injuries to the population, which are the murder,
torture, confinement, and/or enslavement of individuals, and the increased
risk to other individuals of the same treatment. In modem international
law, the injury that a State inflicts on its population is as significant as that
which it inflicts on other States. The rise in stature of human rights law has
carved out an exception to the principle that international law only
regulates interaction between States. The inhabitants of a State, taken
collectively, have rights in international law and therefore have
international legal personality. For this reason, the injury that the
government of a State inflicts on its population is an injury in international
law.
A forcible injury inflicted on a State's own population may give rise
to forcible remedial measures taken against the State. In most cases,
however, the victimized population is too weak to act on its own, so other
States must act on its behalf. When the injury to the population warrants it,
the right of humanitarian intervention may be invoked by any other State.
The remedy is cessation of the injury and reasonable security from further
injury. In the human rights context, the range of appropriate remedies may
include wresting the victimized population from the control of the central
government, i la East Pakistan, northern Iraq and Kosovo, or removing the
offending regime from power altogether, as was the case in Uganda,
Cambodia, and most recently Iraq. No other authority being immediately
available to govem the population of Iraq, the remedy to Saddam Hussein's
excesses was the removal of the Ba'ath regime from power.
C. Two Peas in a Pod - Idi Amin and Saddam Hussein
Whether one analyzes humanitarian intervention conventionally or
using the tort-based approach, a comparison of the cases of Uganda and
Iraq reveals many striking similarities.
57. Id. art. 4(1).
58. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. Uganda Under Idi Amin
When Idi Amin came to power in Uganda in 1971, rule of law was
quickly supplanted in favor of rule by whim. Early Presidential Decrees
gave Amin's security forces broad authority to make arrests without a
warrant and to detain any person suspected of "subversion" indefinitely,
without charge. 59 In 1972 another Presidential Decree retroactively
immunized them from prosecution.60 Further Decrees in 1973 empowered
uneducated, untrained military tribunals to try civilians accused of sedition,
subversion or treason, and for "acts calculated to intimidate or alarm
members of the public or bring the military under contempt or into
disrepute.' Very soon the security apparati were out of control, arresting
and/or executing many civilians because an official decided to possess their
62wives, their homes, or their property. A contemporaneous Amnesty
International report described the situation thusly:
Very large numbers of people are constantly liable to arrest, either
because they belong to a special category of people imagined to be a
threat to the regime, because they were associated with such people by
some direct or indirect tie, because a rival or enemy had given a false
report about them, or because they found themselves in a situation of
having to surrender money, property, or even a wife or relative to
security officers at the risk of their own life.
6 3
Arrestees were usually taken to detention centers, including private
houses, where torture was routine, even without prior investigation or
interrogation.64 Methods of torture included beatings, gouging out of eyes,
electric shocks, rape, and slashing. 65 Detainees were forced to kill other
detainees.66
Idi Amin carried out large-scale persecutions of many ethnic and
religious groups, on a scale which at the minimum would be characterized
today as crimes against humanity.67 Amin's predecessor, Milton Obote,
59. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA, supra note 32, at 3.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15.
66. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 116.
67. In modem parlance a "crime against humanity" constitutes certain enumerated acts,
such as murder, degrading treatment, and ethnic cleansing, if committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
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had been a member of the Lango tribe and both the government and the
army had been dominated by the Lango and Acholi tribes.68 Amin, a
member of the 6% Muslim minority in Uganda, ordered the purging of the
Lango and Acholi from both the civilian administration and the military;
about two-thirds of the Langi and Acholi soldiers were killed.69 Shortly
after Catholic Archbishop Luwum publicly decried the forcible conversion
of Christians to Islam,70 he was murdered, two dozen Christian
organizations were banned, and the persecution of Christians and
massacres of the Acholi and Langi intensified.71 In 1978, after Obote's
London broadcast criticizing the Amin regime for the mass killings,
extensive reprisal killings of more Langi and Acholi took place.72 The
death toll under Amin's rule is estimated at between 200,000 and
300,000.
71
Idi Amin was also responsible for the forced exodus of almost the
entire Asian population from the country. When Amin came to power,
about 45,000 people of South Asian origin lived in Uganda; 26,000 of them
had Ugandan citizenship or applications pending and the rest were British
subjects. Amin cancelled about 12,000 citizenship applications. The U.S.
Ambassador to Uganda at the time wrote that Amin, having already
expelled all Israelis from the country and not finding an improvement in
the economy, "found his scapegoat. He announced that according to the
dictates of his dream, all Asians who were not Ugandans would be required
leave Uganda within three months. 74  Asians with clearly established
citizenship were driven out as well. Business owners (the Asians were the
merchant class) had to leave behind their property; individuals were
allowed to take a few personal belongings and 1000 shillings; jewelry was
confiscated. On the trains, soldiers beat, stoned, and robbed Asians of the
money and personal property that they had been allowed to carry with
them. In ninety days, almost all Asians had left, leaving behind real estate,
cars, bank accounts, and mercantile, most of which went to military
officers.75
Amin's son, Taban, was similarly out of control. Amin sent his son,
68. See MELADY, supra note 32, at 33-34.
69. Id.
70. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 151.
71. See AMII OMARA-OTUNNU, POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN UGANDA, 1890-1985
(1987).
72. See Human Rights in Uganda, supra note 32, at 12.
73. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 162; MuRPHY, supra note 30, at 105.
74. MELADY, supra note 32, at 73.
75. Id. at 70-93.
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who was semi-literate, to Makerere University to study engineering.
Armed and unaccountable for his actions, he raped other students at
gunpoint and when they protested, he called in troops to make male
students dance together and perform "a variety of indecent antics at his
bidding. ,
7 6
What is striking and appalling about the situation in Uganda was that
under Idi Amin, Uganda reverted from a State governed by law to a State
governed by men, with no accountability whatsoever to principles of law,
morality, or rationality. Subject to the whim of any officer of Amin's
apparatus, and not knowing what behavior, political or otherwise, was
expected of them, a large majority of Uganda's population lived in terror.
The situation in Uganda was the type for which the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was meant to remedy.
2. Iraq Under Saddam Hussein
The same year that marked the fall of Idi Amin also marked the rise of
Saddam Hussein and the significant worsening of the human rights
situation in Iraq. Iraq has not had a democratic transition of power since
the country's independence in 1932, 77 so the human rights situation there
must be viewed relative to the coups, assassinations, and customary purges.
Nevertheless, even by those standards the rule of the Ba'ath regimes under
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti were excessively
whimsical and brutal. As early as 1976, during the al-Bakr regime,
Amnesty International cited Iraq as one of two countries in the region
"where the human rights situation gives the greatest cause for concern.' '78
The Ba'ath regime executed members of the Kurdish and Shiite opposition
and arrested many more. 79 Torture of political prisoners was routine as a
means of interrogation and intimidation.80 These practices continued after
Saddam Hussein assumed the Presidency in 1979, for both political crimes
and a vaguely defined crime of subversion.8'
By 1988, the human rights situation in Iraq was dire. Amnesty
International reported that,
76. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 146-47.
77. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY (4"h ed. 1990).
78. THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1 JUNE 1975-31 MAY 1976 179 (1976). The
other country was Iran.
79. Id. at 183-84, 194.
80. Id. at 185.
81. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1981 985 (1982). For a treatment of human rights in Iraq generally in 1981, see id. at 983-
86.
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Thousands of political prisoners.., continued to be arbitrarily arrested
and detained. Many were held for long periods without trial or following
summary trials. The routine use of torture by the security forces
continued to be widely reported, as was the 'disappearance' of large
numbers of people, many of whom were feared executed. Hundreds of
executions were reported, the majority being extrajudicial executions.
82
Methods of torture included gouging out eyes, whipping, sexual abuse,
electric shocks,83 beating, and extracting fingernails and toenails.84  By
1988, the scope of routine torture had widened to include broadly defined
security-related offenses, including currency violations.85
The Ba'ath regime under Saddam Hussein, which was dominated by
Sunni Muslim Arabs, embarked on systematic campaigns against other
ethnic and religious groups. In the early 1980s, Iraqi forces expelled
Iranians and Iraqis of supposed Iranian descent to Iran.86 In 1987, they
expelled many Iraqi Assyrians to Turkey.8 7 In 1988 the regime, already
embroiled in a long-term conflict with Kurdish rebels, displaced about
500,000 Kurdish and Assyrian villagers to areas more easily controlled by
the Government. 88 The regime also used chemical weapons on Kurdish
villages, most notoriously against the town of Halabja.89 An estimated
100,000 Kurdish civilians disappeared in 1988.90 Following Iraq's defeat
at the end of the First Gulf War, the repressed Shiite population in the south
revolted, resulting in mass executions. 91 For more than a year, Iraqi forces
indiscriminately killed Shiite civilians, shelled villages, and bombed them
from the air. About 200,000 displaced Shiites fled into the southern
marshes.92 Iraqi authorities arrested and executed thousands, and drained
and burned the marshes in order to desertify the Shiites' homeland.
93
Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 that the Ba'ath regime denied food
rations to thousands of southern Shiites as a consequence of their
82. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1988 236 (1988).
83. Id. at 237.




87. Id. at 1358.
88. Id. at 1355.
89. See U.N. Doc. S/19823, supra note 7.
90. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1998 205 (1998).
91. See MURPHY, supra note 30, at 167. Shiite rebels themselves are believed to have
also committed atrocities, executing suspected collaborators with the government. Id.
92. Id. at 178.
93. Id. at 180.
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cooperation with the opposition. 94
The human rights situation grew worse in the aftermath of the First
Gulf War and during the U.N. sanctions. The State Department reported an
increase in the number of summary executions since 1997; the list of
offenses carrying a mandatory death penalty included a wide range of
economic offenses such as forgery, smuggling, and insulting the President
or the party. 95 By 1998 methods of torture also included branding, dripping
acid on the skin, and rape, and many torture victims were killed.96 A
political or criminal infraction could mean the punishment of family
members as well.97 The level of brutality achieved by the Ba'ath regime in
Iraq seems to have desensitized even Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, for by 2002 their annual reports contained surprisingly short
sections on Iraq.98 Kenneth Pollack estimates the death toll under Saddam
Hussein at 200,000, with hundreds of thousands more tortured. 99
Even the facts reported above do not present a complete picture of the
depravity of Saddam Hussein and his family. First-hand reports of
individuals once inside the regime reveal the Tikriti clan to have been
completely above the law and unaccountable for their actions. Saddam
Hussein himself was notorious for procuring sexual favors for official
actions, and for coercing many women into sex, including the wives of
cabinet ministers.100 The practices of Saddam's son, Uday, were even more
predatory. His former double recounts his daily routine of cruising coffee
houses, schools and universities for girls and sending his staff to round
them up, as if the entire country were his personal harem, and raping those
who did not consent to sex, all with complete impunity.'01 In 1989, in a fit
94. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999 359 (1999). For explorations of the
right to food as a fundamental human right and its denial as a cause for humanitarian
intervention, see Michael Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention
in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 547 (1987);
David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (2003).
95. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998 1674 (1999). The substantial financial interest of Saddam Hussein's family in the
import of heavy machinery, as well as its alleged involvement in large-scale smuggling
operations, may explain the imposition of the death penalty for certain economic crimes, for
they competed with the family's business operations.
96. Id. at 1676.
97. Id. at 1678.
98. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2002 (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2003 (2003).
99. KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ
124 (2002).
100. See HAMZA, supra note 3, at 145, 171-72.
101. See LATIF YAHIA & KARL WENDL, I WAS SADDAM'S SON 71, 118-19, 127, 152-54,
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of jealous rage, Uday shot and killed an official of Saddam's private staff at
a large banquet because the noise was interfering with his own party.1
0 2
Although he did receive some light punishment for that incident, it did not
deter him from shooting at people at random for pleasure, or publicly
shooting anyone who made him angry.10 3  Saddam Hussein's and his
family's power over the lives of ordinary citizens was absolute.
The corruption of the Tikriti clan during the Ba'ath regime's rule was
equally staggering. In only 20 years the clan amassed a fortune of billions,
even during the period of U.N. sanctions, while the fortunes of non-Tikritis
(and non-Ba'athists) steadily dwindled. It was common knowledge in Iraq
that Saddam's family owned most of the import and export business in
Iraq, including oil exports. Uday Hussein had a substantial stake in the
food production and distribution industries, which he abused to his
profit.I°4 Khidhir Hamza wrote of an associate in the nuclear program who
was one of two senior scientists to be jailed and tortured after questioning
the legality of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. He was released after 20
months and the other was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Hamza has
no doubt that, as his associate's family fortune amounted to tens of
millions, a significant amount of money changed hands to secure his
release. 10 5 Hamza recounts how Uday Hussein, jealous of other Iraqi
businessmen prospering from government contracts, arbitrarily assessed
one of them 30 million dinars (100 million dollars) in back taxes. When
the businessman complained to Saddam, he raised the assessment to 50
million dinars. 0 6 These are merely two examples of what was common
knowledge in Iraq: Saddam Hussein and his extended family impoverished
the nation for their personal profit.
Like Uganda, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a country ruled by the
whim of a few, with no accountability to law. Saddam Hussein and his
family could kill, torture, rape, abuse, imprison, and steal with total
impunity. As a result the lives and basic security of all other Iraqis, even
those who stayed out of politics, was in constant jeopardy.
181-87 (1997).
102. Id. at 166-69. The party incident took place in front of many witnesses, including
foreign dignitaries.
103. Yahia himself was imprisoned and tortured for 23 days, because Uday had learned
that one of his girlfriends had spoken to him. Id. at 251.
104. Id. at 156.
105. HAMZA, supra note 3, at 126-27.
106. Id. at 177-78. Hamza's recounting of the episode is quite vivid, but he does not
state how he came to be privy to such detail. Like much information on Iraqi human rights
and corruption of that era, the story may be anecdotal. Given other, first-hand accounts of
the actions of Uday and Saddam, this author finds the episode believable.
2004]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
D. Humanitarian Intervention Under the Burqa of Self-Defense -
Tanzania and the United States
When Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda and ousted Idi Amin in 1979,
Uganda had accumulated a record of aggression. Substantial evidence,
according to George Ivan Smith, points to Amin's direct collusion with the
perpetrators of the Entebbe airline hijacking in 1976.107 In October 1978,
Ugandan forces occupied the Kagera Salient, which lay in Tanzania but
which Amin claimed for Uganda. One week later, Uganda renounced its
claim to the Kagera Salient, and withdrew its forces, but only after killing
thousands of civilians, stealing whatever was movable and destroying
whatever was not. 10 8 In January 1979, Tanzanian forces invaded Uganda.
At the same time, the former Ugandan President Obote called on Ugandans
to overthrown Idi Amin. Tanzania had not intended to assume the role of
overthrowing Amin, preferring to have left that matter to the Ugandans.
However, the inability of the Ugandan rebels to do so and the entry of
Libyan troops into the war forced that role upon Tanzania. With the help
of Ugandan rebel forces, the Tanzanian army defeated the Ugandan army
and its allied Libyan contingent, ousting the Amin regime in April 1979. A
new provisional government was formed that month. Tanzanian forces
withdrew from Uganda two years later, in 1981.109
Tanzania did not overtly advance a right of humanitarian intervention
as a justification for its invasion, instead taking the conservative approach
of trying to make the situation fit within the confines of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, 110 like a square peg into a round hole. Farooq Hassan has
argued that at the time of the invasion, Uganda did not pose a sufficient
threat to warrant the full-scale invasion and ouster of the government, for
"Tanzania's well-being as a nation state was never in jeopardy."''
Although Hassan is more conservative in his concept of proportionality
than this author feels is appropriate, his argument is essentially sound.
Tanzania's president, already outspoken about the human rights situation in
Uganda, did not attempt to invoke the right of humanitarian intervention
because the doctrine had not been firmly reestablished in the 1970s as a
norm of customary international law, and intervening States were
107. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 122.
108. See Hassan, supra note 32, at 870-72.
109. See WHEELER, supra note 30, at 113-20.
110. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 30, at 77; WHEELER, supra note 30, at 118-19;
Hassan, supra note 32, at 873, note 79 and accompanying text.
111. Hassan, supra note 32, at 903. Recall that Uganda had renounced its claim to any
Tanzanian territory.
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themselves uncertain of its legitimacy. Although Tanzania's violation of
the Charter was not ignored, it was not widely criticized. 1
2
Like Uganda, Iraq had made a name for itself as a rogue, aggressor
State, thanks to the invasion and annexation of Kuwait and the use of
chemical weapons against Iranian forces and against Kurdish villages in the
1980s.13 The leaders responsible for these atrocities were still in power in
Iraq. Consequently, like Uganda, the United States sought to justify the
ouster of Saddam Hussein on the basis of self-defense, focusing its
justification on the threat posed by Iraq's WMDs.1 4 Iraq's human rights
record was a distantly secondary point. 15
Like Tanzania, the United States has not cited humanitarian
intervention as a legal exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter. This is not
as surprising as it would at first seem, for the United States did not use the
words "humanitarian intervention" in its justification of air strikes against
Yugoslavia either.ll 6 To have done so then, and to do so now, would have
been inconsistent with the United States' earlier stances against the
interventions by India in East Pakistan, and especially by Vietnam in
Cambodia, during the Cold War. However, since the United Nations is a
body driven mostly by politics and not by law, a more reliable indicator of
state practice is what States do, not what they say.
Conclusion - The 800-Pound Monkey on the U.S.'s Back
Since the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq in April 2003, the Ba'ath
party has been removed from power in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and most of
the other high-level officials of the regime are in U.S. custody and
Saddam's two sons and heirs apparent, Uday and Qusay, are dead. For
about fourteen months Iraq was in a state of occupation, governed by the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by a U.S. official, and a
governing council consisting of Iraqi official appointed by the CPA. On
June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred its powers to a transitional government
of Iraqi officials and in doing so ceased to exist. Iraqi is again a sovereign
nation. A coalition of 34 nations still maintains about 150,000 troops in
Iraq"l7 with the consent of the new Iraqi government." 8 The Kurdish and
112. Ugandan complaints of Tanzania's invasion to the United Nations were met, in
Professor Franck's words, with "supreme indifference." FRANCK, supra note 30, at 143.
113. See supra note 7.
114. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003) (Statement of Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State).
115. Id. at 17.
116. The United States justified the bombing as "necessary to respond to Belgrade's
brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians." U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988, supra note 49, at 4.
117. See Former Filipino Hostage Returns Home, MSNBC NEWS (July 20, 2004), at
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Shiite populations in Iraq are no longer suppressed, and the extrajudicial
executions and torture perpetrated by the Ba'ath regime have ended.
Saddam Hussein and other high-level officials of the Ba'ath party will be
tried for crimes against humanity. Iraq's nightmare of tyranny under
Saddam Hussein is finally over.
However, Iraq faces new problems which the coalition appears to
have underestimated when it invaded. The country is in the throes of a
three-way insurgency. Ba'ath loyalists, now dethroned, angry and
desperate, are attacking coalition forces and their contractors, and the new
political establishment. These attacks have made it difficult or impossible
for the coalition to rebuild the country's infrastructure, a problem further
compounded by attacks on the infrastructure itself, e.g. the constant
sabotaging of oil pipelines, which may also be the work of Ba'ath loyalists.
Foreign terrorist organizations, probably part of or affiliated with Al-
Qa'ida, are also attacking coalition forces and especially their contractors;
they are most notable for the wave of kidnappings and beheadings of
civilians. Their immediate aim is to drive foreign (i.e. non-Muslim) forces
out of Iraq; their strategic goal appears to be to create conditions favorable
to the rise of an Islamic fundamentalist government. The armed militias
loyal to Shi'ite clerics, most notably the firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr, have
also engaged coalition and Iraqi government forces; their confrontations
have raised the spectre of a power-grab by Shi'ite clerics intent on
establishing a theocratic government oriented toward Iran. Foreign
complicity in one or more of these insurgencies has not been firmly
established, but cannot be ruled out.
Although the Security Council did not authorize the invasion, and
several of its members opposed to it, the Council has nevertheless put its
imprimatur of legitimacy on the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. The
U.S. approach of installing a transitional Iraqi administration during the
occupation had the unanimous support of the Council. 19 In October 2003,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5396761/>. The countries forming the coalition, in
descending order of numbers of participating troops, are the United States (contributing
138,000), Great Britain (contributing 8,500), Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Netherlands, Japan,
Australia, Romania, South Korea (which is quadrupling its forces), Denmark, Thailand,
Bulgaria, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Singapore, Mongolia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Norway, Latvia, Portugal, Nicaragua, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Albania, New Zealand, Estonia, Tonga, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Id. Spain
and the Philippines have recently withdrawn their contingents.
118. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
119. S.C. Res. 1483, 9 (22 May 2003). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14-0;
the Syrian representative was absent but stated in a later meeting that Syria supported the
resolution and would have voted in favor of it. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761, at 1 (2003). A later
resolution welcoming the establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council was enacted by a
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the Council formally authorized the presence of a "multinational force
[MNF] under unified command" in Iraq, and authorized the force to "take
all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq," and even went so far as to urge other States to participate
in it. 120 The consensus of interpretation of this Resolution was that the
U.S.-led coalition forces present in Iraq at the time would constitute that
"multinational force."'121  The MNF's mandate would expire "upon
completion of the political process," i.e. after democratic elections are
held. 22 The Council also requested that the United States, on behalf of the
MNF, submit regular reports to the Council. 23 These stipulations are the
same ones that the Council has imposed on U.N. forces and other
authorized multinational forces. The Council's treatment of the coalition
forces in Iraq is not dissimilar to that of the invasion of Liberia in the 1990s
by the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which took place
without prior Security Council authorization but whose presence the
Council legitimized after the fact. 124
In June 2004 the coalition forces gained even further legitimacy: an
invitation from the new Interim Government of Iraq. On June 5 the
incoming Prime Minister, whose government would assume sovereign
power in Iraq 23 days later, formally requested assistance from the Security
Council in providing security and defense for Iraq, in the form of U.S.-led
coalition forces.125  The Council so provided, in the form of a new
Resolution, and specifically took note of the Iraqi request and reaffirmed its
authorization for the MNF. 126 The consent of the legitimate, recognized
vote of 14-0-1, with Syria abstaining. S.C. Res. 1500, 1 (14 August 2003); U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4808, at 1 (2003).
120. S.C. Res. 1511, 13-14 (16 October 2003). The resolution was adopted
unanimously. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844, at 1 (2003).
121. See S/PV.4844, at 10 (2003) (United States). This approach did not have the
support of all of the members; Pakistan, for example, wanted the multinational force to be a
separate entity from the coalition occupation forces. Id. at 7 (Pakistan). Even Pakistan,
however, acknowledged that the MNF and the occupation force were one and the same.
122. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 120, 15, citing 4-7 and 10.
123. Id. 25.
124. See S.C. Res. 788 (1992); S.C. Res. 813 (1993); S.C. Res. 886 (1993); S.C. Res.
1041 (1996); see also Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International
Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict, 53 ZAORV 603, 633-34 (1993) (concluding that the
Council, in "commending" the accomplishments of ECOMOG after the fact, was itself
implying that ECOWAS needed no prior authorization from the Council to conduct the
Liberia mission).
125. Letter from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi
to the President of the Security Council, Annex to S.C. Res. 1546 (June 5, 2004).
126. S.C. Res. 1546, 9 (2004).
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government of the host State for the presence of foreign forces therein is
the highest form of legitimacy that such forces can obtain.
In terms of legitimacy of a claim of humanitarian intervention, the
United States' greatest challenge is to prevent the current occupation from
being comparable to that of Vietnam in Cambodia. In contrast to the
Uganda case, Vietnam installed the successor government to the Khmer
Rouge, and Vietnam's forces remained in Cambodia for a decade.
27
Factors contributing to this challenge include the lack of other democratic
Arab states to serve as a model for Iraq, and the need to prevent the rise of
a new fundamentalist dictatorship. It is difficult to be optimistic about
Iraq's prospects in the face of the insurgencies, the lack of support of other
Arab nations, the new anti-American hatred fueled in part by the Arab
media, and the relentless second-guessing of the status of Saddam's WMD
programs, which the United States still contends was its primary
justification for the invasion. These short-term problems, especially the
last one, obfuscate the inescapable conclusion that in the long term, Iraq
and the rest of world are all better off without the dictatorship of Saddam
Hussein.
127. See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD
WAR II 42-43 (1997). But see KLINTWORTH, supra note 33, at 8, 72, 90 (arguing that the
presence of Vietnamese troops remained necessary to prevent the Khmer Rouge, which still
occupied a portion of the country, from regaining power). Weisburd's exposition of the
facts appears to support Klintworth's view.
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